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ABSTRACT
This Note focuses on two cases, Maher v. Roe and Harris v.
McRae, and argues that they represent watershed moments in the
reproductive rights movement because they positioned abortion as a
fundamental right in name only. In both cases, the Supreme Court
sanctioned severe funding restrictions and refused to grant poor
women the right to state and federal assistance for elective and “non-
therapeutic” abortions. “Non-therapeutic abortion” refers to those
abortions performed or induced when the life of the mother is not
endangered if the fetus is carried to term or when the pregnancy of
the mother is not the result of rape or incest reported to a law en-
forcement agency.
This Note contends that by articulating the abortion right as
stemming from the “right to privacy,” the Court effectively ruled out
the possibility of public assistance for abortions. In contrast, a better
approach to this issue would be to use an equality framework
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause. This approach would in-
struct courts to invalidate state abortion restrictions that either 1)
impose a burden on the reproductive choices of women when there is
no equivalent restriction placed on men; or 2) have a disparate im-
pact on indigent women. These missed opportunities to reorient the
Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence under the Equal Protection
Clause continue to have lasting effects on women’s access to abortion,
as the Court continues to weaken the Due Process standard articu-
lated in Roe, enabling it to uphold increasingly prohibitive state
restrictions on abortion.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that access to a safe and effective abortion has become a
privilege rather than a right. Congress has banned Medicaid insurance from
covering almost all abortions and 29 states have enacted additional restric-
tions on insurance coverage of abortion.1 This means the women who will
see the greatest negative impact from an unwanted pregnancy are the same
women who are the least likely to be able to obtain an abortion.2 In fact, a
1. Saria Gupta, Abortion Should Be a Right for Working Women – Not a Privilege, TIME
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://time.com/4034008/women-reproductive-health-care-op-
tions/.
2. Unintended pregnancies can negatively impact educational attainment for mothers.
Additionally, unplanned births are detrimental to a woman’s economic status and
income and can reduce the probability of participation in the labor-force by as much
as 25 percent. When a woman falls below the poverty line prior to her unintended
birth, the negative impact on her education, employment, and economic status will
be that much more dire. Adam Thomas, Policy Solutions for Preventing Unplanned
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woman who seeks an abortion but is unable to get one is three times more
likely to fall into poverty than a women who is able to terminate her
pregnancy.3
The Supreme Court sanctioned these funding restrictions and refused
to grant poor women the right to state and federal assistance for elective and
“non-therapeutic” abortions in Maher v. Roe4 and Harris v. McRae.5 “Non-
therapeutic abortion” refers to those abortions performed or induced when
the life of the mother is not endangered if the fetus is carried to term or
when the pregnancy of the mother is not the result of rape or incest re-
ported to a law enforcement agency. This Note contends that by articulat-
ing the abortion right as stemming from the “right to privacy” the Court
effectively ruled out the possibility of public assistance for abortions. The
privacy doctrine in this context, first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut,6
and later fully fleshed out in Roe v. Wade,7 instructs the Court to balance
the interest of a woman in obtaining an abortion against the government’s
interest in protecting the life of a fetus.
In contrast, this Note argues that a sex-equality framework, grounded
in the Equal Protection Clause, would provide a much better approach to
this issue. This approach would instruct courts to invalidate state abortion
restrictions that impose a burden on the reproductive choices of women
when there is no equivalent restriction placed on men, thereby invalidating
the laws at issue in Maher and Harris.
In addition, the challenged legislation in Maher and Harris raise issues
of equal protection centered on income inequality in that they have a dispa-
rate impact on indigent women. Both laws should have been invalidated on
these grounds. The Court should have taken the opportunity in either
Maher or Harris to reorient its reproductive rights jurisprudence under an
equal protection framework, rather than continuing to ground its analysis in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These missed op-
Pregnancy, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (March 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/re-
search/reports///; ANA NUEVO CHIQUERO, THE LABOR FORCE EFFECTS OF UN-
PLANNED CHILDBEARING (2010), http://www.unavarra.es/digitalAssets/141/
141311_100000Paper_Ana_Nuevo_Chiquero.pdf; See also Stanley K. Henshaw,
Theodore J. Joyce, Amanda Dennis, Lawrence B. Finer & Kelly Blanchard, Restric-
tions on Medicaid Funding for Abortions: A Literature Review, GUTTMACHER INSTI-
TUTE, (June 2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MedicaidLitReview.pdf
(“Approximately one-fourth of women who would have Medicaid-funded abortions
instead give birth when this funding is unavailable.”).
3. Gupta, supra note 1.
4. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
5. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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portunities continue to have lasting effects on women’s access to abortion,
as the Court continues to weaken the due process standard articulated in
Roe, enabling it to uphold increasingly prohibitive state restrictions on
abortion.
I. A HISTORY OF THE COURT’S REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE JURISPRUDENCE
BEFORE 1977
Since 1965, the Supreme Court has justified its protection of repro-
ductive rights, including a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, by refer-
ence to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 There are
several explanations for why the Court chose this doctrinal framework over
one grounded in ideas of equal protection and sex equality. These include
the timing of the Court’s first reproductive rights case in relation to the
development of its sex discrimination doctrine, the arguments advanced by
plaintiffs in various reproductive rights cases, and the fight for the Equal
Rights Amendment.
A. The Two Pillars of the “Right to Privacy”: Griswold and Roe
Despite the fact that Roe is often cited as the moment when arguments
in favor of reproductive rights and those in favor of sex equality began to
diverge,9 the Court had already grounded its reproductive jurisprudence in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to 1973. The
Supreme Court’s due process analysis of reproductive rights began with
Griswold v. Connecticut.10 In a landmark opinion, the Court held that a law
forbidding the use of contraceptives violated married couples’ constitutional
“right to privacy.”11 Privacy, as the Court used it, was a form of freedom
from the intrusion of the state. Griswold launched the Court’s use of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect fundamental
rights.12 The case undoubtedly laid the groundwork for a series of Supreme
8. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis
and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 828 (2007) (stating that
“the doctrinal separation of abortion and equal protection began with the court’s
decisions in Roe, Frontiero, and Geduldig.”). See also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985 (1984) (“Since 1973, literally
hundreds of legal challenges to restrictive abortion laws have been brought, and only
a very few have argued that the restrictions violated sex equality norms.”).
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
12. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 33 (1999) (“Griswold was the birth of this controversial constitu-
tional right [to privacy].”).
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Court opinions striking down other state restrictions on contraception, in-
cluding Eisenstadt v. Baird13 and Carey v. Population Services International,
Inc.14, which invalidated anti-contraception laws as applied to unmarried
individuals and minors, respectively.
Griswold also laid a solid foundation for Roe. On January 23, 1973,
the Court held in Roe v. Wade15 that the constitutional right to privacy
protects the right of women and their physicians to determine whether or
not to terminate a pregnancy.16 Despite the decision’s overwhelming impor-
tance to women, it was grounded on the principles of due process and indi-
vidual liberty, rather than the principle of sex equality.17 The plaintiffs had
not challenged the Texas law as an example of sex discrimination,18 and
therefore the Supreme Court did not rely upon the sex-specific impact of
abortion restrictions. There was no mention of discrimination against
women or the impact that an unintended pregnancy has on a woman’s
independence, productivity, or self-fulfillment.
B. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Fight for Sex Equality
Although Griswold set the stage for Roe, placing reproductive rights
firmly in the Due Process doctrinal framework, there were several other fac-
tors that contributed to the complete absence of equal protection language
in Roe.
First, in 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was submitted to
the states for ratification after lengthy hearings in Congress.19 At the time, a
Yale Journal article20—”written by several feminist legal scholars and
13. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
14. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54.
18. The Texas statute challenged in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), criminalized
abortion unless undertaken to save the life of the mother. The plaintiffs argued that
a woman’s constitutional right to privacy was being unduly burdened by the statute.
Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted a physician’s right to administer health care with-
out arbitrary interference. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 120–22.
19. S. REP. NO. 92-689 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-359 (1971). For congressional hear-
ings in 1970–72, see Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231
Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970); The “Equal Rights”
Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. On Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970); Equal Rights for Men
and Women 1971: Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208 and Related Bills & H.R. 916 and
Related Bills Before Subcomm No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.
(1971).
20. Barbara A. Brown, et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
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Thomas Emerson, one of the nation’s leading scholars on constitutional
civil rights and liberties”—was seen as highly dispositive of the intended
meaning of the amendment,21 yet “made no mention of laws restricting
access to abortion.”22 This seems to indicate that the strongest proponents
of the amendment either did not consider access to abortion a pillar of sex
equality or felt that the issue was so controversial it could derail the passage
of the amendment.
Further, the political opposition to the ERA used abortion as a
weapon to discourage and diminish support for ratification.23 According to
Yale Law School Professor and noted feminist scholar Reva Seigel, “Phyllis
Schlafly’s first published attack on the ERA in February of 1972—a year
before Roe was handed down—characterized the women’s movement as
‘anti-family, anti-children, and pro-abortion,”24 and “mobilized opposition
by framing abortion and homosexuality as potent symbols of the new family
form that ERA would promote.”25 Following the decision in Roe, anti-ERA
activists argued that the ERA, despite the absence of any language even
implicitly referencing abortion, would constitutionalize the abortion right.26
Advocates of the ERA were forced to separate reproductive rights from their
advocacy for sex equality, “seeking to avoid sex equality reasoning for the
right during litigation of the abortion funding cases and through hearings
on the extension and reintroduction of the ERA.”27
Second, the Court’s precedent on equal protection was probably too
limited and underdeveloped at the time of Roe to reach reproductive rights,
as the idea of constitutionally mandated sex equality had just begun to take
hold. The Supreme Court did not apply the Fourteenth Amendment’s guar-
antee of equality to sex classifications until 1971, when in Reed v. Reed they
struck down an Idaho law that gave men a blanket preference over women
as administrators of estates.28 The unanimous decision in Reed signified that
reviewing courts would treat classifications based on sex less deferentially,
but the opinion did not explain why or how this would look.29
That same year, the Court decided Eisenstadt, which was grounded in
equal protection doctrine, but not sex-based equal protection. The chal-
lenged law in that case, prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives except
21. Law, supra note 9, at 975–76.
22. Id. at 977.
23. Siegel, supra note 9, at 827.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 828.
28. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. Law, supra note 9, at 974–75.
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by doctors to married people, was based on the distinction between married
and unmarried people, which the Court held violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Court missed a valuable op-
portunity to reorient its reproductive rights jurisprudence in sex equality
doctrine, which would have provided a stronger basis for the decision.31 As
noted constitutional law scholar Sylvia Law explained:
Even assuming that both parents bear equal responsibility for the
child after birth, only women are confronted with the choice of
obtaining an abortion or enduring the physical burdens of preg-
nancy. A more forceful decision in Eisenstadt, based on the sex
equality principle, could have accepted the legitimacy of the state
interest in discouraging sex outside of marriage, yet still con-
cluded that, despite this interest, denying women access to con-
traception ‘prescribes pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted
child as punishment for fornication.’ The unwanted pregnancy
is not simply a burden women must, in the nature of things,
bear. Where the state denies access to contraception, it is a bur-
den the state imposes.32
Two years later, in the same term as Roe, the court addressed the sex-
equality issue again. In Frontiero v. Richardson, ACLU counsel Ruth Bader
Ginsberg challenged a military practice that automatically allowed the wives
of male officers to be considered as dependents and thus receive the rights of
dependents, but required female officers to actually prove their husbands
were dependent on them in order to receive these same benefits.33 Plaintiff’s
brief incorporated themes of historical oppression, the value of individual-
ity, and the irrationality of sex-based stereotypes:
First, historically women have been subjugated, their essential
humanity denied, and the pedestal upon which they have been
placed has all too often been a cage. Second, women seek to be
judged on their individual merits; the stereotypes of married
women as economically dependent are inaccurate generally and
particularly as applied to the Frontieros. And third, sex is an
immutable characteristic that frequently bears no relation to the
ability to perform or contribute.34
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
31. Law, supra note 9, at 977–78.
32. Law, supra note 9, at 978 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448).
33. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
34. Law, supra note 9, at 979-80.
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The decision in Frontiero was fractured: four Justices ruled that sex-based
classifications should receive heightened scrutiny; four concurred in the re-
sult but thought it sufficient to invalidate the classification as unreasonable,
without addressing the appropriate constitutional standard for sex-based
classifications.35
Frontiero is a prime example of the “assimilationist vision” of sex
equality, which minimizes the significance of biological differences between
the sexes.36 Those with the most power to influence the Court’s constitu-
tional doctrine of sex-based equality, namely the ACLU and proponents of
the ERA, adopted this theory whole-heartedly.37 Simultaneously, those re-
sponsible for petitioning the Court in support of reproductive rights “em-
phasized rights of privacy, physician discretion, and the vagueness and
uncertainty of the criminal laws prohibiting abortions.”38 According to Law,
the decision to move the fight for reproductive rights out of the framework
of sex equality reflected a belief that privacy was a less controversial, and
therefore stronger, constitutional argument.39 This belief was no doubt
driven by the fact that “the right to privacy” applied to both women and
their male physicians, whereas sex equality under the Equal Protection
Clause would have a more obvious and direct effect on women only.
C. Framing Reproductive Rights as a Necessary Condition to Equality:
Missed Opportunities
Despite this history, there were some feminist scholars and activists
who pushed the Court to consider a sex equality argument in relation to
reproductive rights before and during the course of deciding Roe. In 1971,
the Court decided United States v. Vuitch, where plaintiffs challenged a Dis-
trict of Columbia law banning abortion except when necessary for the
health or life of the mother as unconstitutionally vague.40 An amicus brief
filed by Human Rights for Women, Inc. argued that the anti-abortion stat-
ute denied women, as a class, the equal protection of the law guaranteed by
35. Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
36. Law, supra note 9, at 963 (“The assimilationist ideal posits that some characteristics
– race, sex, eye color – do not describe differences that should ever be allowed to
matter in any significant way. . . . The assimilationist vision asserts that it is unjust to
distribute rights or responsibilities on the basis of distinctions that do not ever de-
scribe relevant differences – sex, race, or eye color. The vision is best developed in
relation to race. The assimilationist view of sex equality is attractive to constitutional
lawyers because it builds upon analogies between race- and sex-based
discrimination.”).
37. Id. at 981.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 981–82.
40. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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the Fifth Amendment.41 The brief contended that the abortion ban re-
stricted opportunities for women, including the opportunity to pursue
higher education, to earn a living through purposeful employment, and, in
general, to decide their own future, as men are so permitted.42
The effect of the abortion statute is to penalize women in areas
of their lives which have nothing to do with their childbearing
role. An accident of biology – the fact that women conceive and
men do not – is used as an excuse to discriminate against women
in jobs, admission to schools, fellowships and research grants,
and so on.43
Another amicus brief filed by the Joint Washington Office for Social
Concern raised the argument that abortion bans have a disparate impact on
poor women.44 The brief argued that when women are forced to seek out
illegal abortions, those with fewer monetary resources will procure cheaper
and more dangerous procedures, thereby subjecting themselves to an in-
creased risk of complications:
If social caste cannot be identified by the clothes women wear it
can be identified by the kind of abortions they buy. With
money, abortions may easily be obtained – even in the shadow
of legislative halls where they were banned. The degree of legality
is measured by the money the women can pay. The price paid by
the poor is often death – always blood, sweat and tears. . . . No
matter what the intent of Congress may have been when the
statute was passed these are the conditions which it preserves:
not the life and health of women. . . . It degrades and discrimi-
nates against women by reason of their economic status and de-
nies them the right of choice as free people.45
41. Brief for Human Rights for Women, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, United States
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84), 1970 WL 136420 [hereinafter Amicus Brief
for Human Rights for Women].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Brief for the Joint Washington Office for Social Concern, Representing the Ameri-
can Ethical Union, American Humanist Association and the Unitarian Universalist
Association and for the Unitarian Universalist Women’s Federation as Amicus Curiae
at 11, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84), 1970 WL 136422.
45. Id.
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Despite these persuasive arguments grounded in both sex and eco-
nomic equality, the Court upheld the DC abortion ban.46 Although Justice
Douglas wrote a strongly worded dissent, he justified his opinion by refer-
ence to the Due Process doctrine employed in Griswold, rather than the
Equal Protection Clause.47
Struck v. Secretary of Defense48 was another missed opportunity to reo-
rient the Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence in the Equal Protection
Clause. The plaintiff, Captain Struck, challenged Air Force rules that re-
quired female officers to be discharged if they became pregnant unless they
obtained an abortion.49 Captain Struck argued the rule violated the Equal
Protection Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.50 Her challenge was unsuccessful in the lower courts, but on October
24, 1972, less than three months before Roe was decided, the Supreme
Court granted her petition for certiorari.51 Once cert was granted, the Air
Force retreated from its position and granted Captain Struck a waiver to the
regulation, permitting her to continue to serve as an Air Force Officer. As a
result, the case was remanded for mootness.52 Justice Ginsberg contends
that the Struck case, had it been given proper consideration, would have
instructed the Justices sitting on the court at the time “that disadvantageous
treatment of [a woman] because of her pregnancy and reproductive choice is
a paradigm case of discrimination on the basis of sex.”53 By providing such a
clear-cut example of the inherent entanglement of reproductive rights and
equal protection, the case would have surely realigned the abortion discus-
sion under the sex equality doctrine in both the Court and the general
public.
Despite the prevalence of sex equality arguments in favor of reproduc-
tive rights in 1973, the Court grounded its monumental opinion in Roe
exclusively on Due Process grounds, never mentioning equal protection or
reasoning rooted in sex equality.54 This is somewhat surprising given the
46. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
47. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 78 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
48. 409 U.S. 947 (granting certiorari in 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971)), remanded for
consideration of mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
49. Air Force Regulation 36-12(40), set out in relevant part in Brief for Petitioner at
2–3, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 947 (1972) (No. 72-178); see also Struck v.
Sec’y of Def., 4460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Struck, 409 U.S. 947 (No. 72-178).
51. Struck, 409 U.S. at 947 (1972).
52. See Memorandum for the Respondents Suggesting Mootness (Dec. 1972), Struck v.
Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 947 (No. 72-178); Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071 (remanding for
consideration of mootness).
53. Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178)
1972 WL 135840 [hereinafter Ginsburg Brief].
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
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fact that at least one amicus brief challenged the Texas statute on sex equal-
ity grounds.55 The brief acknowledged the fact that, at first glance, abortion
restrictions do not seem to implicate equal protection concerns because the
laws only relate to women.56 However, the brief argued that the equal pro-
tection framework was indeed appropriate, “[f]or the effect of the laws is to
force women, against their will, into a position in which they will be sub-
jected to a whole range of de facto forms of discrimination based on the
status of pregnancy and motherhood.”57
D. Reproductive Rights and Sex Discrimination Doctrine: 1973–1977
Following Roe, the Court continued to apply the Due Process frame-
work to reproductive rights cases, grounding its decisions to strike down
abortion restrictions in the “right to privacy,” while upholding state regula-
tions limiting access to abortion by citing a state’s compelling interest in
protecting the life of the fetus. In 1975, the Court decided Connecticut v.
Menillo, which upheld a state statute requiring that only physicians provide
abortions.58 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, plaintiffs
challenged a Missouri statute that required prior written consent for an
abortion from a parent (in the case of a minor) or a spouse (in the case of a
married woman).59 The Court invalidated the state requirement on the basis
that the spousal and parental consent requirements gave third parties an
absolute veto power over a woman’s constitutionally mandated right to have
an abortion that even the state itself did not possess.60
In the same time period, the Court cabined its sex-equality doctrine,
limiting its extension to issues of employment and education. In 1974, the
Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello, ruling that the denial of insurance benefits
for work loss resulting from normal pregnancy was not sex discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Court rejected arguments
that laws discriminating against pregnant women reflected sex stereotyp-
ing62 and held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not violate
55. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, et al. at 24–25, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-40) 1971 WL 134283.
56. Brief Amicus Curiae at 27, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-40).
57. Brief Amicus Curiae at 27, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-40).
58. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
59. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
60. 428 U.S. at 52.
61. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
62. See Ginsburg Brief, supra note 53, for an early brief arguing that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy violates equal protection (arguing involuntary discharge from
the Air Force due to pregnancy is presumptively unconstitutional because it enforces
sex stereotypes in violation of equal protection).
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the Equal Protection Clause as it was not inescapably the same as sex
discrimination.63
II. MAHER V. ROE AND HARRIS V. MCRAE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
UNDERSTOOD AS CHALLENGES TO SEX DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity in Maher v.
Roe and Harris v. McRae to re-categorize state abortion restrictions as sex-
based state actions prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
A. The Inevitable Failures of “the Right to Privacy”
By 1977, the “right to privacy” established in Griswold and cemented
in Roe framed the legal conversation around abortion.64 In that year, the
Court in Maher v. Roe again analyzed challenges to abortion restrictions
through the due process lens.65 In Maher, indigent women challenged a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the state from funding abortions that were
not medically necessary.66 The district court held that the regulation was
unconstitutional because it denied equal protection:
The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type of ex-
pense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it morally op-
poses such an expenditure of money. To sanction such a
justification would be to permit discrimination against those
seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the
state simply does not approve of the exercise of that right.67
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not require a state participating in the Medicaid program
63. The Court ruled that discrimination against pregnant women is not necessarily dis-
crimination on the basis of sex while leaving open the possibility that some types of
classifications based on pregnancy might be unconstitutional sex discrimination. See
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20 (“While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy
is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed. . . .”).
64. Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy,
1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 355–56 (“In the fifteen years that followed [Roe, 410 U.S.
113], the Court applied this framework to invalidate nearly all restrictions against
abortion.”).
65. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
66. 432 U.S. 464.
67. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
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to pay the expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent
women simply because it had made a policy choice to pay expenses incident
to childbirth.68 The Court stated that there was no “constitutional right to
an abortion,” but rather, only a constitutional right to have the government
not unreasonably interfere with a woman’s decision to have an abortion.69
According to the Court, the right identified in Roe “implies no limitation
on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.”70
The case is instructive on the limitations of the Due Process frame-
work, for the Court was able to justify its decision by citing the state’s
compelling interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, overcoming
the right of women to access abortion.71 The majority stated: “Because the
pregnant woman carries a potential human being she ‘cannot be isolated in
her privacy. . . . [Her] privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she
possesses must be measured accordingly.’ ”72 Maher is an example of how
easy it has become for the Court to qualify and limit a woman’s “right to
privacy.” In a very telling reference, the Court quotes Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co. for the proposition that the Connecticut legislature should be
the one to decide whether or not to expend state funds for abortion.73 Al-
though the citation makes logical sense in the course of the Court’s argu-
ment, it seems to be wildly out of place in a decision regarding the
protection of a fundamental right since Lee Optical is commonly known as
the archetypal opinion explaining rational basis review.74 In what may have
been a Freudian slip, the Court more or less acknowledged that it was no
longer applying a heightened standard of review to state abortion
restrictions.
It is no surprise then that three years later, the Court upheld another
abortion restriction on the grounds that a woman’s right to privacy did not
overcome a government’s right to give preferential treatment to women car-
rying a fetus to term over those seeking an abortion.75 In September 1976,
68. Maher, 432 U.S. at 465–66.
69. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
70. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
71. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478.
72. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 159).
73. Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (“Our conclusion that the Connecticut regulation is consti-
tutional is not based on a weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws ‘because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought.’”) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
74. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
75. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297–98 (1980).
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Congress prohibited the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified cir-
cumstances including the endangerment of the mother and for victims of
rape and incest.76 This provision was referred to as the Hyde Amendment.77
In Harris v. McRae, the Court held that the constitutional freedoms pro-
vided in Roe v. Wade do not extend to access to public funds.78 Further, it
held that women are not entitled to the financial resources necessary to fully
avail themselves of their constitutional right to access an abortion.79
The federal law at issue in Harris bore a close resemblance to the state
law at issue in Maher, as they were both designed to coerce indigent women
to bear children that they would otherwise not elect to have. By funding all
of the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the expenses incurred
when terminating a pregnancy, the government, whether federal or state,
made an offer indigent women could not afford to refuse. Although the
Court is technically right that the laws in both Maher and Harris simply
seek to make childbirth more attractive, in reality, they make it the only
option for some women. By effectively denying at least some women access
to abortion, the government “impairs the woman’s capacity for individual
self-determination . . . [and] the capacity of responsible citizenship.”80 It is
the rhetoric of privacy that allows the Court to deny these fundamental
rights to women, because it “blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is
women who are oppressed when abortion is denied.”81
B. The Promising Potential of a Sex Equality Analysis
Had the Court taken the opportunity to analyze the challenged laws
in both Maher and Harris under the framework of equal protection, it
might have found good reason to invalidate these restrictions. As constitu-
tional law expert Cass Sunstein points out, an Equal Protection argument
“sees a prohibition on abortion as invalid because it involves a cooptation of
women’s bodies for the protection of fetuses.”82 More importantly,
Unlike the privacy view, this argument does not and need not
take a position on the status of the fetus. It acknowledges the
possibility that fetuses are in important respects human beings.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18023.
77. Id.
78. Harris, 448 U.S. at 302.
79. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–17.
80. Law, supra note 9, at 1017.
81. Id. at 1020.
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornog-
raphy, Abortion, and Surrogacy) 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 (1992).
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It is entirely comfortable with the claim that the destruction of a
fetus is at least a morally problematic act. But it asserts that
under current conditions, the government cannot impose on
women alone the obligation to protect fetuses through a legal act
of bodily cooptation.83
Therefore, an equal protection argument is highly preferable to a pri-
vacy argument because it properly frames the restrictions on government
funding for abortion as a way of coercing women into allowing own their
bodies to be co-opted in order to protect the life of another. This analysis
illuminates what is so deeply troubling about these and other abortion re-
strictions: “Government never imposes an obligation of this sort on its citi-
zens – even when human life is uncontroversially at stake.”84
There is little reason to think that the sex equality analysis was not
available to the Court at the time of Maher and Harris. The argument that
restrictions on federal and state funding for abortion should be considered a
form of sex discrimination does not take a giant leap of logic since the
restrictions involve a defining characteristic of being female. Sunstein ex-
plained, “If a law said that ‘no woman’ may obtain an abortion, it should
readily be seen as a sex-based classification,” so “[a] law saying that ‘no
person’ may obtain an abortion has the same meaning.”85 An equal protec-
tion holding in either case may have required that the Court revisit and
even overturn its opinion in Geduldig. That was not out of the question,
however, given the backlash Geduldig received,86 in addition to Congress’s
extension of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy.87 Further, as previously noted, the District Court
invalidated the law at issue in Maher on the grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Harris also defined the issue as
one of equal protection: “When the sovereign provides a special benefit or a
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 34. For examples of this proposition, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354 (2d ed. 1988).
85. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 32–33.
86. Law, supra note 9, at 983 (“Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage
industry.”).
87. Congress provided in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 that “the
terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). The PDA is intended to require that pregnancy, child-
birth, and other related medical conditions are treated as well as any medical disabil-
ity not unique to one sex. See Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytic
Approach, 5 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 83, 102 (1979).
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special protection for a class of persons, it must define the membership in
the class by neutral criteria; it may not make special exceptions for reasons
that are constitutionally insufficient.”88 It is clear, then, that the equal pro-
tection argument was on the table when the Court decided both Maher and
Harris. Both cases presented the Court with a prime opportunity to re-
categorize reproductive rights as an equal protection issue, rather than a
privacy issue. The Court could have declared that the government may not
employ the law to restrict women’s autonomy and opportunities in ways
that it does not restrict men by virtue of maintaining the traditional ideals
of sex and procreation. Unfortunately, the Court maintained its division of
reproductive rights and issues of sex equality to the detriment of women,
and in particular, indigent women.
III. MAHER AND HARRIS ARE ALSO PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD AS
CHALLENGES TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
ECONOMIC STATUS
In the years after Roe, it became clear that the Court considered the
right to have an abortion as a negative right: the Constitution mandated
that women be free from governmental interference with their choice, but
they did not have a positive right of access to abortions. No two cases more
clearly demonstrate this concept of abortion as a negative right than Maher
v. Roe and Harris v. McRae. In both cases the Court rejected indigent
women’s claims that their due process and equal protection rights were vio-
lated by a state’s exclusion of “nontherapeutic” abortions from its Medicaid
coverage and by the Hyde Amendment.89
The majority opinions in both cases expressed that a woman’s poverty
was her problem alone, regardless of its effect on her ability to procure a safe
and effective abortion, and that the state had no stake in her personal out-
come.90 In particular, “[t]he [Harris] majority implied that the protection of
liberty in the Due Process Clauses, from which the right to choose abortion
stems, was a protection of negative liberty, not an affirmative guarantee of
government services.”91 Treating the right to an abortion in this way allowed
the majority in both Maher and Harris to ignore the disparate impact the
regulations had on women of lesser economic means. Had the Court chosen
to acknowledge that the law at issue in each case created different rights for
88. 448 U.S. at 349.
89. Maher, 432 U.S. 464; Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
90. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–17.
91. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”?: Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and
the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 313 (2000).
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those with means and those without, it might have reached a different out-
come on the basis of equal protection.
In fact, prior to the Maher decision, the Court had already held on
several occasions that indigent people were entitled to certain rights that
required the government to either provide for or subsidize the correspond-
ing benefits.92 The majority of these cases were decided on equal protection
grounds.93 It was therefore far from unthinkable at the time Maher was
decided that the Equal Protection Clause should protect against invidious
discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic status. Indeed, Frank
Michelman, one of the preeminent Constitutional scholars in his day, had
addressed this possibility in 1969,94 later coining the term “welfare-rights,”
which came to represent the idea that American citizens might have not
only moral, but also constitutional rights to provisions for certain basic in-
gredients of individual welfare, including health care.95
The idea behind “welfare-rights” can logically be extended to abortion
restrictions. In reality, the idea that the abortion right raised issues of class,
as well as gender, had been percolating since before Roe.96 “Protecting abor-
tion as an equality right would give poor women access to safe abortions,
and free all women from the indignities of asking ‘the man’ for permission
not to bear a child.”97 As mentioned above, an amicus curae brief in United
States v. Vuitch—a case decided in 1970, seven years before Maher and ten
years before Harris argued that abortion restrictions unduly burden indigent
92. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process requires state to
provide indigents access to divorce procedures); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (equal protection compels state to provide indigents with counsel for single
appeal as of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (equal protection compels
states conditioning full direct appellate review of criminal convictions on trial tran-
scripts to provide those transcripts to indigents); cf., e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa
Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (durational residency requirement for nonemergency
medical care violates equal protection by denying newcomers “basic necessities of
life”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires hearing prior to
termination of welfare payments).
93. See Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. 250 (holding that durational residency requirement for
nonemergency medical care violates equal protection by denying newcomers “basic
necessities of life”); Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (holding that equal protection compels
state to provide indigents with counsel for single appeal as a right); Griffin, 351 U.S.
12 (holding that equal protection compels states conditioning full direct appellate
review of criminal convictions on trial transcripts to provide those transcripts to
indigents).
94. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969–70).
95. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
96. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 825.
97. Id.
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women.98 The dissenting justices in Harris latched onto this argument. Jus-
tice Brennan in particular noted the impact that the Hyde Amendment
would have on indigent women and further called for heightened scrutiny:
Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment does not foist that
majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our
Nation, rich and poor alike; rather, it imposes that viewpoint
only upon that segment of our society which, because of its posi-
tion of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy
rights from the encroachments of state-mandated morality. The
instant legislation thus calls for more exacting judicial review
than in most other cases.99
Had the Court adopted Brennan’s view, it would have found the
Hyde Amendment unconstitutional on equal protection grounds and po-
tentially created a new suspect class: indigent people. This decision could
have had monumental effects on reproductive rights jurisprudence, signifi-
cantly limiting the ability of states to create abortion restrictions, the likes of
which we see today.100 Instead, the Supreme Court continued to espouse
the traditional privacy framework grounded in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, opening the door for restrictive state abortion
regulations that have a dangerous disparate impact on low-income
women.101
IV. ASSUAGING DOUBTS: AN EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK WOULD
PROVIDE STRONGER PROTECTION FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS
If one were to take a cynical view of the Court and its treatment of
reproductive rights, they would certainly be tempted to argue that, regard-
less of the doctrinal framework, the conservative members of the Court
would find a way to uphold state laws restricting access to abortion. In order
98. Brief for the Joint Washington Office for Social Concern, supra note 44, at 11.
99. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980).
100. Targeted regulation of abortion providers, also known as TRAP laws, are regulations
that single out abortion clinics for medical regulations no other clinics that provide
similarly low-risk services need to obey. The number of states with TRAP restric-
tions more than doubled between 2000 and 2014. Fifty-nine percent of women in
the country now live in a state that has a TRAP law designed specifically to reduce
access to safe abortions. Amanda Marcotte, The Anti-Abortion Laws are Getting
Smarter, SLATE (July 9, 2014) http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/07/09/
guttmacher_institute_report_on_abortion_restrictions_trap_laws_are_super.html.
101. See Introduction supra; Conclusion infra.
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to counter this argument, it is helpful to examine the Court’s treatment of
one of the other major social issues of the late twentieth century: same-sex
marriage. In 1986, the Court heard one of its first cases regarding gay rights,
Bowers v. Hardwick.102 The Court upheld a ban on sodomy in Georgia,
dismissing the argument that the law was a violation of the “right to pri-
vacy” established in Griswold: “[N]o connection between family, marriage,
or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated.”103 This supported some legal theorists in concluding
that the privacy doctrine first articulated by Justice Douglas in Griswold was
now incoherent and unpredictable.104
Following the blow in Bowers, the gay rights movement began to move
away from the language of “privacy” and due process, and towards the lan-
guage of equality.105 The first legal result of this linguistic shift came in
2003, when the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, declaring a
Texas sodomy ban unconstitutional.106 Although the majority relied on a
due process argument, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion fo-
cused on equal protection,107 laying the groundwork for future arguments
advancing gay rights centered on equality.
The equality argument was even more fitting in the context of the
fight for same-sex marriage: the rite of marriage centers on a public declara-
tion of commitment and devotion. There is nothing private about the act of
getting married. Not surprisingly then, the Court based its decision in U.S.
v. Windsor, where it struck down the Defense Of Marriage Act, on the
“Constitution’s guarantee of equality,” rather than any privacy-based argu-
ment.108 Instead of declaring gay and lesbian people a protected class, the
majority ruled out any of the government’s “reasonable” justifications for
the classification, which left only the obviously unconstitutional justifica-
tion of “animus.”109
At the same time that gay rights were expanding, reproductive rights
were contracting due in large part to the continued reliance on the privacy
doctrine by both the Court and reproductive justice advocates. In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, the Court held that the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that
102. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
103. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
104. See Martha Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74
J. AM. HIST. 959, 960–62 (1987).
105. See Jill Lepore, To Have and to Hold, NEW YORKER, May 25, 2015, 34, 37–38.
106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
108. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
109. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate pur-
pose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
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employers provide their employees with health insurance that covers contra-
ception improperly infringed upon the religious liberty of a for-profit cor-
poration, which was protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.110 The majority’s opinion emphasized that the Health and Human Ser-
vices Department did not sufficiently prove that access to insurance that
included coverage for contraception was a compelling interest.111 The out-
come in both Windsor and Hobby Lobby came down to one vote: that of
Justice Kennedy. If contraception and the right to an abortion were seen as
indispensable elements of sex-equality, rather than a matter of privacy, Jus-
tice Kennedy, and potentially other members of the Hobby Lobby majority,
may have been forced to rule against the for-profit corporation seeking to
deny women access to medical treatments that ensure their place as equal
citizens under the law.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the elusions above, it is impossible to predict what the Court’s
reproductive rights jurisprudence would have looked like had the decisions
in Maher and Harris come out differently. However, as early as 1992, it was
clear that the privacy doctrine was no longer adequate to sufficiently protect
reproductive rights. That year, the Court decided Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.112 In some respects, the opinion was a
victory for pro-choice advocates, as the court declined to overturn Roe.113 In
other respects though, the opinion, which qualified Roe in significant ways,
was a huge setback for reproductive rights. The Court abandoned Roe’s tri-
mester scheme and substituted an “undue burden” standard,114 whereby
regulations that do not completely prohibit abortions prior to fetal viability
will be upheld as long as they do not have the purpose or effect of imposing
a substantial burden on women seeking abortions.115 Nineteen years after
110. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
111. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“HHS asserts that the contraceptive mandate
serves a variety of important interests, but many of these are couched in very broad
terms, such as promoting ‘public health’ and ‘gender equality’ . . . RFRA, however,
contemplates a ‘more focused’ inquiry.”)
112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
114. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
115. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–78 (joint opinion); see also id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
joined by White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be subjected to
‘strict scrutiny’ and could be justified only in the light of ‘compelling state interests.’
The joint opinion rejects that view.”).
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Roe, the privacy standard had been so watered down that it is difficult to see
how it was significantly more stringent than rational basis review.116
Today, 32 states and the District of Columbia prohibit the use of state
funds for abortions except in those cases in which federal funds are availa-
ble, or in other words, when the woman’s life is in danger or the pregnancy
is the result of rape or incest.117 South Dakota goes even further, limiting
funding to cases of life endangerment.118 It is difficult to see how these laws
would survive legal challenges had the Court taken the opportunity in
Maher and Harris to re-categorize the issue of reproductive rights as one of
sex-equality rather than privacy. 
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
520 (1989) (suggesting that the state need assert only a “legitimate” interest to sus-
tain an abortion-related restriction). For examples of current state abortion restric-
tions see State Policies in Brief: An Overview of State Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
117. GUTTMACHER, supra note 116, at 1.
118. Id.
